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Abstract
In a beauty contest framework, we consider a Stackelberg game in which public
authorities decide the accuracy of public information taking into account how it
aﬀects the acquisition of private information and the choice of individual actions
in equilibrium. We ﬁnd that, irrespective of the strength of the beauty contest
motive, an increase in the precision of public information increases welfare when
its marginal cost is not higher than that of private information. In this case,
a more precise public information, by reducing the incentives for acquisition of
private information, induces socially valuable savings of private resources.
Keywords: Public information, private information, coordination, welfare
JEL classiﬁcation: C70, D82, E10
1 Introduction
In a highly debated paper, Morris and Shin (2002) have shown that public information
may have a detrimental eﬀect on welfare in a beauty contest framework. In the same
∗We are grateful to Alessandro Pavan, and to an anonymous referee for very useful suggestions.
Preliminary versions of this paper have been presented at the 13
th CEF International Conference, and
at the 2007 SED Annual Meeting. The usual disclaimers apply.
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1context, Cornand and Heinemann (2007) argue that social welfare rises when more pre-
cise public information reaches only a fraction of market participants, while Svensson
(2006) questions the empirical plausibility of Morris and Shin’s result. Angeletos and
Pavan (2004) show that public information is welfare improving in presence of positive
investment spillovers. In a monopolistic competition framework, Hellwig (2005) ﬁnds
that it can be socially valuable to disregard some private information, as ﬁrms partly
neglect their contribution to aggregate risk. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) develop a
unifying framework where the impact of public information on welfare depends on the
degree of complementarity or substitutability among agents’ actions. Finally Hellwig
and Veldkamp (2006), focusing on optimal individual information choices, show that
strategic complementarities in actions induce coordination motives in private informa-
tion acquisition.
In this note we investigate the welfare eﬀects of public information when both
private and public information are endogenous. We consider the beauty contest model
examined in Morris and Shin (2002), but we assume that private agents choose the
precision of their private information after observing the precision of public information
set by a public authority. Such modeling of the information acquisition process is
consistent with the widespread idea that private agents are typically faster than public
authorities in adjusting the accuracy of their information.
The public authority acts as a Stackelberg leader, who optimally exploits the fact
that an increase in the precision of public information reduces the incentives for ac-
quisition of private information, thereby inducing socially valuable savings of private
resources. The negative welfare eﬀect of the reduction in the precision of private infor-
mation is, in fact, more than compensated by the corresponding cost-saving eﬀect. Our
main result shows that a more precise public information is welfare enhancing when
the marginal cost of public information is not higher than that of private information.
2T h e S e t u p
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents indexed by the unit interval [0,1].
Every agent observes noisy private and public signals about the fundamental θ ∈ R,s o
2that information is incomplete. We consider a two periods setting. In period −1, agents
observe the state of the economy (θ−1), then a public authority acting as a benevolent
social planner chooses the precision of next period public information by maximizing
the sum of individual expected utilities, and ﬁnally private agents decide how much to
invest in the precision of their private signals. In period 0, every agent receives her
signals (public and private), and chooses an action aﬀecting her utility as well as that
of the other individuals.
The state of the economy evolves according to the stochastic process
θ = θ−1 + χ.
The shock χ (normally distributed with mean zero, variance σ2
θ, and hence precision
αθ ≡ σ−2
θ ) occurs at the beginning of period 0. All agents — private and public — have
ac o m m o nex ante expectation θ−1 of the state variable θ, which allows us to compute
ex ante expected utilities, and hence welfare, on a common stand-point.
At the beginning of period 0,e v e r ya g e n ti receives a public signal, y,a n dap r i v a t e
signal, xi:
y = θ + η,
xi = θ + εi,
where η is normally distributed, independent of θ, with mean zero and precision αy, and
the noise terms εi are normally distributed, independent of θ, η,a n dεj (j 6= i), with
mean zero and precision βi.N o t et h a ty is common knowledge to all agents, whereas
xi is speciﬁc to each agent i and not observable by the others. The precision of the
private signal may vary across agents.
The common posterior for θ, given public information, is normally distributed with
mean E(θ|y)=
αθθ−1+αyy
αθ+αy , and precision P(θ|y)=αθ + αy. We deﬁne z ≡ E(θ|y),
and α ≡ αθ + αy. Private posteriors are normally distributed, with mean E(θ|y,xi)=
αz+βixi
α+βi and precision P(θ|y,xi)=α + βi. It is easy to show that in our setting
the deﬁnition of precision coincides with the notion of ‘accuracy’ of agents’ forecasts
introduced by Angeletos and Pavan (2007).
Agent i’s payoﬀ function is
ui (a,θ,βi) ≡−(1 − r)(ai − θ)
2 − r
¡
Li − ¯ L
¢
− C (βi) − Ti, (1)
3where a is the action proﬁle over all agents, ai ∈ R denotes agent i’s action, θ represents









C (βi) is the cost of choosing precision βi,a n dTi is a lump-sum tax used by the public
authority to ﬁnance the acquisition of public information. Agents acquire independent
signals in a market where the price for a unit of precision is p.1 Hence:
C (βi) ≡ p · βi.
O b s e r v et h a tt h eﬁrst two terms in Equation (1) coincide with agent i’s payoﬀ func-
tion in Morris and Shin (2002), while the third and fourth terms capture the costs of
information acquisition. Note also that the loss Li increases in the distance between
agent i’s action and the action proﬁle of the whole population. Hence, r captures the
weight of a beauty contest externality: the larger r is, the more important the second
guessing motive for each agent is.
3 The Equilibrium
The equilibrium is solved by backward induction. In period 0, for given signal preci-
sions, agent i chooses action ai by maximizing E (ui (a,θ,βi) | y,xi,θ−1),w h i c hg i v e s






As in Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2004), we construct a linear
equilibrium in which
aj = γz +( 1− γ)xj, (3)
where γ is a parameter being determined in equilibrium.
1The assumption of a constant price per unit of precision seems natural. With Gaussian distur-
bances, agents who have access to several independent signals can combine them in a suﬃcient statistic,
the precision of which is the sum of those of the original signals. Accordingly, the cost of the precision
for the ‘aggregate’ signal is the sum of the prices of the signals, and the relation between precision and
its cost is linear. This induces the information providers to opt for a pricing policy that is linear in
precision, i.e. for a constant unit price of precision.
4Assuming that all agents other than i follow the strategy given in (3), and that they
all choose the same precision of information β = βj at t = −1,w et h e nh a v et h a t
Z 1
0
aj · dj = γz +( 1− γ)θ,
in which case agent i’s best response reduces to
ai =( 1 − r)Ei (θ)+r(γz +( 1− γ)Ei (θ)) = (4)
(1 − rγ)Ei (θ)+rγz,
where
Ei (θ)=δiz +( 1− δi)xi, (5)
with δi = α
α+βi.
Rearranging, (4) reduces to
ai = γiz +( 1− γi)xi, (6)
where
γi =( 1− rγ)δi + rγ. (7)
Because agent i has zero-measure, the equilibrium value of γ when all agents j other




1 − r(1 − δ)
, (8)
with δ = α
α+β. Simple algebra shows that δ is the correlation across agents’ forecasting
errors on θ; hence it corresponds to the notion of ‘commonality’ in Angeletos and Pavan
(2007).
Substituting for γ from (8), Equation (7) can now be rewritten as
γi =
(1 − r)δi + rδ
1 − r(1 − δ)
. (9)
Note that γi = γ if δi = δ (equivalently if βi = β), and that γi <γif δi <δ :a
higher precision of agent i’s private signal (i. e. a lower δi) implies a smaller weight on
the public signal.
5Having characterized the equilibrium at time 0, we can now move backward studying
agent i’s choice of βi. From Equation (1), her expected utility at time −1 can be written
as


















2 dh dj | θ−1
¸
− p · βi − Ti.
Using the results for period 0 obtained above, after some tedious algebra, (10) becomes:
E [ui (a,θ,βi) | θ−1]=−
(1 − r)(α + β)
2










− p · βi − Ti.
(11)
Agent i chooses βi ≥ 0 so as to maximize (11). Because E [ui (a,θ,βi) | θ−1] is
concave in βi, the solution is given by the ﬁrst order condition
(1 − r)
2 (α + β)
2
(α +( 1− r)β)
2 (α + βi)
2 − p + μ =0 , (12)
where μ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint βi ≥ 0.
We need to consider two cases. When p ≥
¡1−r
α
¢2, the unique symmetric equilibrium
is given by βi =0for all i, so that the expected utility reduces to







¢2, the unique symmetric equilibrium is









Focusing on Equation (12), it is apparent that individual decisions to invest in
private information acquisition are strategic complements, as in Hellwig and Veldkamp
(2006). In fact, an increase in β implies a higher accuracy but a lower commonality,
since the precision of agents’ forecasts on θ improves but the correlation of forecast
errors across agents is reduced. Due to the lower commonality, private agents have less
incentives to coordinate, as they give more prominence to their private information in
forecasting other agents’ decisions (one immediately sees from Equation (8) that γ is
decreasing in δ ). In a beauty contest framework, an agent not increasing the precision
6of her private signal would suﬀer from the reduction in coordination, without gaining
anything in terms of improved accuracy. Hence, for such an agent a more precise private
information becomes more valuable.
It is important to notice that, from (12), it also follows that the precisions of private
and public information are strategic substitutes. An increase in αy (and therefore in α,
since α = αθ+αy) implies both higher accuracy, and higher commonality. The increase
in commonality induces stronger coordination, which in a beauty contest framework
beneﬁts every private agent. At the same time, due to the decreasing marginal utility
of precision, the increase in accuracy makes individual precision less valuable. By
inspection of (14), it follows that the crowding out eﬀect of the precision of public
information on the acquisition of private information becomes larger the stronger the
beauty contest motive is (i. e. the larger r). In fact, an increase in public information
has a coordinating power which is stronger the larger is the beauty contest motive.
Such an increase reduces more than proportionally agents’ willingness to purchase more
precise private information.
4A g g r e g a t e w e l f a r e
Having determined how the equilibrium depends on public information, we now turn
to the impact of αy on social welfare.
We assume that the cost of the precision of public information is linear and equal
to ˜ p; moreover, to rule out the case in which it would be optimal not to acquire neither
public nor private information, we assume that p<[(1 − r)/αθ]2. The precision of the
private information chosen by the agents in the ﬁrst stage of the game is endogenous
in that of the public signal set by the welfare-maximizing social planner in the second
stage of the game. Several cases need to be investigated, depending on the choice of
the precision of public information set by the planner, which in turn is aﬀected by the
comparison of the prices of public and private information.
Suppose ﬁrst that the choice of the social planner in the second stage of the game
implies a precision of the public signal suﬃciently low to induce agents to acquire
private information in the ﬁrst stage of the game; i. e. α ≤ (1 − r)/
√
p,s ot h a tβ ≥ 0
7(see Eq. (14)). In this case, the ex ante utility is given by
E [ui (a,θ,β) | θ−1]=−
(1 − r)
³
α +( 1− r)
2 β
´
(α +( 1− r)β)
2 − p · β − ˜ p · αy. (15)
The social planner maximizes (15) subject to β ≥ 0 and to (14), deﬁning the optimal
precision level chosen by private agents. The derivative of (15) with respect to αy is
given by:



















and, using the fact that
dβ
dαy = − 1
1−r,w eo b t a i n








− ˜ p. (16)
Equation (16) is best discussed in terms of accuracy and commonality of informa-
tion. When β is strictly positive, an increase in the precision of public information
leads to an increase in commonality, and to a reduction in accuracy (because of the
reduction of β). As shown by Angeletos and Pavan (2007), this contributes to lower
welfare when one does not take the cost of information acquisition into account. This
eﬀect is highlighted by the ﬁrst addendum in (16), while the second one shows the
cost-saving eﬀect induced by the reduction of the individual incentives to invest in the
precision of private information.
By substitution of (14), Eq. (16) reduces to:
dE [ui (a,θ,β) | θ−1]
dαy
= p − ˜ p,
which is positive whenever p>˜ p. We thus established the following result:
Proposition 1 With non negative investments and linear costs for both private and
public information, welfare increases in the precision of public information if p>˜ p.





−αθ. It is immediate
to observe that, when p>˜ p, the precisions of private and public information are set
8equal to β =0and αy =¯ αy, respectively; for p<˜ p, these precisions are β = 1 √
p − αθ
1−r







αy ∈ [0, ¯ αy].
Consider now the case α ≥ (1−r)/
√
p, so that private agents do not acquire private
information and the corresponding ex ante utility is equal to E [ui (a,θ,βi) | θ−1]=
−1−r
α − ˜ p · αy. It is easy to see that in this case the marginal value of the precision of
public information is always positive.
The social planner maximizes E [ui (a,θ,βi) | θ−1] under the constraint α ≥ (1 −
r)/
√
p, which implies αy ≥ ¯ αy. Hence, we immediately obtain that
α∗




− αθ, ¯ αy
¾
.
Accordingly, to characterize the solution of the planner problem, we must distin-
guish two cases:




˜ p − αθ, 2 and hence
E [ui (a,θ,βi) | θ−1]=˜ p · αθ − 2
p
˜ p(1 − r). (17)
When the cost of the precision of public information is low, it is set at a high
level by the social planner knowing and exploiting the fact that private agents have no
incentives to invest in the precision of private information.
Aii) p<(1 − r)˜ p so that α∗
y =¯ αy,a n d






(1 − r) (18)
In this case, the cost of private information precision is low in comparison to that
of public precision. Accordingly, a social planner who aims at inducing no private
investment in information sets the precision of public information at the lowest level
consistent with no information acquisition by private agents.
To fully characterize the social planner’s policy, we need to compare the social wel-
fare obtained in cases Ai) and Aii) above with that attained when the chosen precision








y ≥ 0), because this is already implicit





and p ≥ (1 − r)˜ p.
9of public information induces private agents to set the precision of private information
either to zero or to the level (14), depending on p and ˜ p. As for the second term in the
comparison, from the analysis above it follows that:
Bi)w h e n p>˜ p and p<[(1 − r)/αθ]2, the equilibrium is β =0and αy =¯ αy,
so that the social welfare is






(1 − r); (19)
Bii)w h e n p ≤ ˜ p and p<[(1 − r)/αθ]2,w eh a v eβ = 1 √
p − αθ
1−r and αy =0 ,
which imply the following social welfare
E [ui (a,θ,βi) | θ−1]=p · αθ − (2 − r)
√
p. (20)
Cases Ai)a n dAii) must therefore be compared with Bi)a n dBii).
When p>˜ p and p<[(1−r)/αθ]2, the planner must compare (17) with (19). As the
private cost is higher than the public one, it is immediate to conclude that the optimal




˜ p − αθ, inducing β =0 .
For (1 − r)˜ p ≤ p ≤ ˜ p and p<[(1 − r)/αθ]2, the social planner needs to compare
(17) with (20). To do so, observe that the inequality
˜ p · αθ − 2
p
˜ p(1 − r) ≥ p · αθ − (2 − r)
√
p,
is veriﬁed at p =˜ p, for r ∈ [0,1), with the equality applying for r =0 . Moreover, when
p =( 1− r)˜ p, the above inequality is satisﬁed for ˜ p>(1 − r)/α2
θ, which however is
outside the portion of the parameters space for this sub-case. Observe also that the
second derivative of the right hand side of the inequality is always positive. Hence, there





(and hence β =0 )for all p>p ∗.
Finally, when p<(1−r)˜ p and p<[(1−r)/αθ]2, the planner compares (18) with (20).
In this case, it is immediate to check that p is low enough for the central planner being
optimal to let the private agents to provide all the information, so that β = 1 √
p − αθ
1−r,
and αy =0 .
The above discussion is summarized by the following proposition:
10Proposition 2 For all p>p ∗, p∗ ∈ [(1 − r)˜ p, ˜ p], the social planner provides public




˜ p − αθ, and private agents do not acquire private
information.
To understand why it is optimal to provide only public information even when
its cost exceeds the price of private information precision, observe that α∗
y > ¯ αy,f o r
r ∈ (0,1). This follows from the fact that, since
dβ
dαy = − 1
1−r, when the social planner
aims at inducing an equilibrium in which β ≥ 0, he under-invests with respect to the
case in which private agents have no incentives to invest in the precision of private
information.
Summarizing, when the costs of information acquisition are taken into account, not
only the Morris and Shin non-monotonic eﬀect of increasing the precision of public in-
formation disappears, but also the social planner’s optimal choices call for the provision
of public information only for a larger set of prices than in the absence of the beauty
contest externality. This occurs because an increase in the precision of public informa-
tion — increasing coordination among private agents — reduces more than proportionally
their incentives to improve the precision of the available information.
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12Appendix
To obtain the single-individual utility function (11), we concentrate on the ﬁrst three





















In the following, we take as understood that the expectation is computed from the
standpoint of the period −1 information set. First, we focus on the ﬁrst addendum in






= −(1 − r)E
h




Recalling that z ≡ E(θ|y)=
αθθ−1+αyy







+( 1− γi)xi − θ
¶2#
.





αθθ−1 + αy(θ−1 + χ + η)
αθ + αy























Substituting for γi (Eq. (9)), we obtain
−(1 − r)
(
[(1 − r)δi + rδ]
2 /α +[ ( 1− r)(1 − δi)]
2 /βi




13and, after developing the terms in square brackets:
−
(1 − r)




















Because δi = α
α+βi, and (1 − δi)=
βi













































+( 1− γ)(χ + εj) − (1 − γi)(χ + εi)
¶2#
,
Because α ≡ αθ + αy,α θ ≡ σ−2
θ , and αy ≡ σ−2













Finally, as for the third addendum in Eq. (A1), we simply observe that, from the


























which — by substituting for γ and γi from Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively — becomes:
−
r
[1 − r(1 − δ)]
2
∙
(1 − r)2(δ − δi)2
α
+
(1 − r)2(1 − δi)2
βi
−

































Notice that, from the deﬁnition of δi, we have: δ2
i(α + βi)/(αβi)=δi/βi. Hence:
−
r(1 − r)2



























































Recall that (1 − 2δ)=
β−α


















(1 − δ)(δi − δ) (A5)
We now consider the sum of (A2) and (A5), that is:
−
(1 − r)
















(1 − δ)(δi − δ)
¸
.
Focus on the term inside the square brackets in the equation above, and collect the




(1 − r(1 − δ))2
½£








r(1 − r)(1 − δ)δi
β






Collecting rδ, the second and the fourth addenda in the curly brackets of the last
equation become rδ
£
rδα−1 − (1 − r)(1 − δ)
¡
α−1 − β−1¢¤
, that is: rδ[(−1+r+δ)α−1+
+(1−r)(1−δ)β−1]. Because (1−δ)β−1 = δα−1, the last expression can be written as
rδ[δ − (1 − r)(1− δ)]α−1. Using again (1−δ)β−1 = δα−1 in the third addendum gives
−r(1 − r)δδiα−1; ﬁnally, adding this expression to the ﬁrst addendum and simplifying
we obtain (1 − r)δiα−1. Accordingly, Eq. (A6) can be rewritten as:
−
(1 − r)
α(1 − r(1 − δ))2 {(1 − r)δi + rδ[δ − (1 − r)(1 − δ)]}.




























(1 − r)(α + β)2







(α + β)2 (α − (1 − r)β)
¸
,
from which Eq. (11) in the main text follows immediately. Notice that, when βi = β,
we obtain an expression that is equivalent to social welfare as deﬁned by Morris and
Shin (2002).
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